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Introduction
Foreign Military Sales (FMS) generated $113 billion in international agreements from 2008-2011 and have enabled a higher level of integration with our allies and coalition partners. 2 This paper suggests a way sales could be improved, thereby enhancing international security cooperation, while simultaneously aiding in mitigating funding risk to our modernization programs and industrial base. To seize the opportunity the Army must organize by establishing policy and strategy designed to aggressively pursue mutually beneficial sales between allies and the U.S.
Reflecting on the success seen in recent sales and personal experience highlights an opportunity and sets expectations for increased future FMS, but begs the primary research question: Can the Army further mitigate modernization funding risk by increasing foreign military sales effectiveness? In this context, sales effectiveness is achieved by way of better aligning existing or emerging allied requirements with U.S. modernization plans and production capacity. Based upon the evidence of the beneficial impacts to existing Army modernization programs such as the Apache helicopter program, this paper establishes a working hypothesis. This hypothesis conceptualizes that by maintaining or increasing sales, while improving the effectiveness of those sales through information sharing and by actively focusing allies on programs where we have common needs and available capacity, the investment focus gained will reduce the risk to modernization and the industrial base. This mitigation would be a second order effect of supporting our primary motive of improving our ability to operate within alliances and with coalition partners thereby building partner capacity and shaping the international environment to prevent or win our nation's wars.
The working hypothesis provides an end that aids in framing a potential strategic approach. This conceptual strategy may be a blinding flash of the obvious, but is it really? The Army's primary approach to measuring successful FMS is in dollars per program. Often reports containing these measurements are followed by supporting commentary such as, "the sale resulted in achieving economic order quantity." In general, modernization program successes derived from FMS can largely be attributed to luck rather than by design. Selling more is not always the answer. What is missing is a focus on what needs to be sold to best sustain Army modernization programs, while simultaneously advancing our national interests. Seeking out and making sales where a program has a production gap, unused capacity, needed modernization, or where a key requirement is not fully funded is an unexamined strategic approach. Can key leader emphasis on making the right sales not just more sales bring about a new view of how we can successfully manage modernization programs? If this concept shows potential as a viable approach that could produce consistent returns with little downside, then why not seize this opportunity and explore its benefits? This hypothetical approach is not a modernization funding shortfall panacea, but rather a complementary strategy that is intended to reduce program risk while nesting neatly into the Army vision for the future.
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The Budget Problem
In late 2011, the Army Chief of Staff (CSA), General Ray Odierno, proclaimed that the U.S. Army's roles are to prevent conflict, shape the international environment, and win the nation's wars. The prevent, shape, win construct are elements of a clear and concise vision for the Army, but the realities of our nation's economic situation make the work of designing effective supporting strategies extremely difficult. 3 The
Department of Defense (DoD) is bracing for over $ 979 billion in federal deficit reduction measures that will likely take effect in 2013. 4 The Under Secretary Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD, AT&L) stated that the Budget Control Act of 2011's (BCA P.L. 112-25) automatic cuts trim roughly 11 percent from each of the Defense Department's 2,500 budget lines. 5 A cut in this fashion will make it impossible for DoD to prioritize the cuts resulting in unknown second and third order effects on programs. Regardless of size of the funding decrement or what legislative form it takes, it is most likely that defense spending will decrease over the next decade. The Service
Chiefs have been publicly raising concern regarding the potentially detrimental effects of decisions made in response to these budget cuts. The constraints imposed upon the Service Chiefs will result in a force readiness versus modernization budget decision. 6 It is reasonable to expect the Army will fund readiness of the force to the maximum extent possible.
The modernization programs in jeopardy are in all stages of a product's life cycle.
Unfortunately, the trade space involved with these strategic resourcing decisions could be very limited. As directed by the President, personnel accounts will be off limits for the 2013 budget reduction. In an October 2011 testimony to Congress, the Army's G8 and This shift in funding is evidence that modernization is already being impacted by the budget decrements.
Senior leaders often loosely define modernization as new technology to counter emerging threats. 13 They are generally thinking about big systems for big problems. This definition is limited and does not capture the full importance of modernization to the Army's future battlefield effectiveness. In reality, modernization of systems often includes the "blue collar" work of correcting obsolescence, improving sustainability, and enhancing maintainability or is a solution used when a major component supplier exits the market. These reasons for modernization are not uncommon and highlight a risk accepted by the Army's intended approach of correcting budget shortfalls by funding readiness, while reducing modernization investment. As an example of producing needed capability while simultaneously accomplishing "blue collar" modernization, the The Army's leadership has established the first order effect of these cuts are potentially immediate and will continue to impact the Army's readiness and capability to modernize throughout the following decade. This problem has a second order effect:
maintaining the strategic resource of our industrial base. What do we stand to lose due to the impending budget cuts? In the same testimony to Congress mentioned above, Army senior leaders stated that preservation of critical industrial base sectors of capability must be taken into consideration in order to ensure we have the capability to source our military's critical needs from industry within our own borders. 14 The greatest concern is the immediate effect of an abrupt significant decrease in spending on defense during an economic downturn. Technical, manufacturing, supply chain and 7 retail support job skills will evaporate without a viable job market to offset these losses.
It would be expected that a healthy economy would absorb these losses by providing other opportunities, but our economy is not currently healthy. Based upon the proposed decrement in spending businesses and economists contend that 1,010,000 defense industry related jobs may be lost by 2014. 15 This corporate downsizing will result in an aggregate 1 percent decrease in gross domestic product that same year, while national unemployment would increase .7 percent. Of those jobs, 130,000 will be manufacturing positions. The National Manufacturers Association prediction is the states most affected by the Budget Control Act (BCA) will be California, Texas, and Virginia, each of which may lose greater than 100,000 jobs. The risk to our industrial base is in the loss of skilled employees, but also the weakening of already low-density industries such as shipbuilding, rotary wing aircraft manufacturing, and armored vehicle production. The defense industries response to defense cuts of this magnitude, as seen in the 1990's, is mergers to gain efficiencies. 16 Mergers with international firms have become popular allowing greater access to U.S. markets for those firms, but results in fewer choices to induce competition or support Buy American mandates. Without sufficient funding for development, production, or system sustainment through reset and remanufacturing the industrial base will readily right size leaving us with even fewer options for future contracts. The current economic environment poses great challenges for Army modernization and the American industrial base, but within this quagmire exists opportunity. This opportunity originates from our current and proposed future efforts to support our allies' military equipment needs.
Linking Opportunities to Needs
As the U.S. military reduces the size of its standing forces and in some cases its presence in countries around the world it is important to consider the net benefit of engagement through security cooperation with our allies and potential coalition partners.
This engagement produces military-to-military contacts and subsequently enables significant sales of U.S. manufactured arms. In 2011, the U.S. sold through the FMS program greater than $66 billion dollars worth of military gear to allies. 17 The total Department of Defense FMS portfolio value of items sold but not delivered is $385 billion representing engagements with 224 countries. 18 In 2012, the Army completed international agreements for the sale of over $17 billion in helicopters, training, and ground support equipment in a single sale. 19 These sales facilitate important international ties that bind the U.S. with our allies. Each sale of U.S. manufactured gear contributes to higher levels of interoperability, builds partner capacity, and generates a more effective alliance or coalition fighting force for the regions combatant commander.
This contribution supports the Army's vision for the future. In his 2012 posture statement, the CSA defines the role of the Army as prevent, shape, and win. Shaping is focused on making the combatant commanders effective within the international environment by setting the conditions for "assuring our friends and containing our enemies." 20 The effort placed on security cooperation directly supports the CSA's shape task by engaging our allies and providing an avenue for them to "build the capacity to defend themselves" through the acquisition of U.S. equipment. 21 FMS is the security cooperation function that enables this to happen and represents an opportunity that may simultaneously benefit force modernization.
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The Army's strategic leadership is facing an uncertain future, but they can count on one thing with a high level of certainty: the Army's budget will decrease. While tough decisions will have to be made regarding resourcing the force for readiness and modernization, taking action now by employing a variety of mitigation strategies will enable us to better posture for the unknown threats of the future. How will the Army's leadership balance this readiness and modernization equation for the Army of 2020?
With the examination of evolving budgets and the FMS revenue stream, opportunities generated by FMS investment beg further consideration in "how" leadership might contribute to balancing this equation. An opportunity exists to utilize this revenue stream more efficiently and effectively. The strategic rationale for considering FMS as a mitigation tool is based on its already proven contributions to the Army. Those contributions include empowering allies, enhancing the Army's capability to modernize through direct investment, and supporting the industrial base through exports. 22 To meet the immediate demands of national security, readiness is an ever present imperative for the Army and it will generally trump modernization in near to mid term strategic investment decisions. Budget decrements will affect modernization more significantly than readiness in the near future. Given the strong demand for U.S. military equipment and decreasing defense budgets, this paper highlights the criticality of FMS to the Army of 2020 and considers the opportunity provided in the FMS revenue stream.
Foreign Military Sales
Why examine FMS as a potential mitigating tool for the risk associated with decrements to Army modernization? First, examine the worldwide markets potential.
The Congressional Research Service (CRS) reports the 2011 overseas weapons sales by the U.S. (all services) exceeded $66 billion out of a global arms market valued at $85 billion. 23 Some international sources put the potential worldwide arms market value at greater than $400 billion. 24 39 The President in accordance with the AECA makes the determination prior to initiation of this process that a prospective purchaser is eligible to participate in the military sales program. 40 Once initiated, the FMS program is conducted through Federal Acquisition Regulation based contracts or agreements between the USG and the foreign purchaser. 41 These government-to-government agreements to sell and transfer defense articles and services are called Letters of Offer and Acceptance (LOAs) which occur at the foreign nation acceptance phase identified above. 42 The LOA provides the international agreement, and the authority for the U.S. to procure equipment for the allied nation and the contract represents the actual sale of the items.
The time elapse between an agreement and a contract can exceed one year. The USG receives the equipment from the manufacturer and then transfers it to the allied nation.
The focus of this paper's recommendation is the activity prior to the LOA where early engagement based upon emergence of foreign nation's requirements can result in a U.S. sale and early alignment of common needs and available capacity.
A recent change in security cooperation policy better enables the enterprise to support engagement with foreign customers prior to the LOA and even prior to the initial customer request. This initial request is called a Letter of Request (LOR). Previously, the SAMM limited the use of administrative funds for pre-LOR activity to $25,000 or 1/4
work-year (greater of the two). This policy greatly affected the ability of the security cooperation enterprise to properly resource and adequately address a foreign customer's early questions and concerns. These early engagements and transfer of information effectively create the body of knowledge used by the country to establish its base requirement and inevitably to make a purchase decision. The change in policy recognizes the criticality of this early engagement with the customer and provides for additional financial resources provided by DSCA equating to 8 percent of the total fiscal years administrative budget not to exceed $ 1 million without approval. 43 The approach requires the implementing agencies to forecast the pre-LOR and case development efforts required for the budget year. This key change in DoD policy will enable effective early coordination by the Army with foreign customers and supports the sales strategy proposed by this paper.
Examining how FMS customers, PMOs, and the security assistance enterprise operate today helps highlight a potential solution. This single perspective is not meant to be an indictment of the security assistance enterprise, but rather a general observation of the enterprises performance including the PMO's contribution. First, FMS customers push their requirements to SCOs, or other security cooperation team members and then are subjected to the USG's FMS process timelines. FMS customers like the security of the USG handling program management, but generally are not pleased with the time required to deliver the equipment. Throughout the process, the security assistance enterprise works to answer questions regarding price, availability, and system capability based upon the PMO's input. Second, PMO's find it difficult to plan and efficiently coordinate for FMS requirements. Once the FMS requirement makes it through the process and becomes a funded requirement the PMO can respond to the demand by contracting. It is very difficult to nest these requirements into a program and often times the PMO reacts rather than adequately planning for FMS. Examples of this situation begin with contracting when the timing of FMS requirements may or may not synchronize with major USG procurements. This may result in higher costs to the customer due to an inability to include the FMS buy within the USG contract.
Additionally, FMS procurements not synchronized with Army production may result in production lines under or over capacity. Because of the latter, a lack of sufficient production capacity results in drawn out deliveries to the FMS customer. Early The primary interests, initiatives, and incentives that bring these organizations and commands together vary, but they share the common interest of shaping to make each U.S. combatant commander effective within the international environment by setting the conditions for "assuring our friends and containing our enemies." 44 A primary interest for the security cooperation community is pre-LOA coordination between USASAC, PEO, PMO, and the OEM. USASAC is pursuing initiatives to better coordinate activities amongst stakeholders to ensure enterprise efficiency and effectiveness in engagements with the foreign nation as a customer. The PEO and PMO share interest in finding ways and means to execute their modernization mission and in maintaining a healthy industrial base. The PEOs and PMOs are concerned with resourcing development activities, maintaining production capacity, and sustaining systems throughout their life-cycle. The OEM's interests are customer satisfaction, selfpreservation, and as a business, they are incentivized to increase corporate value for shareholders. All of these activities would be pointless if it were not for the GCC's interest of creating interoperable alliances and coalitions that complement and reduce the burden on U.S. forces. The stakeholder's interests, initiatives, and incentives display important overlap and key system linkages that could be exploited by crafting a cross enterprise team to counter the impacts of reduced RD&A spending.
Analysis and Recommendations
The Army's role is to prevent, shape, and win in a period of inevitably decreasing budgets. To meet that mission, it is possible that Army leaders will maintain readiness at the expense of modernization until a budgetary equilibrium is achieved. These realities and potentialities help define the lens used for a strategic scan of the environment for this analysis. As previously highlighted in this paper, the current scan renders key information regarding a growing global FMS arms market, increasing U.S. arms sales, and stakeholders with common interests in shaping the international environment. How can consideration of these variables through critical thought regarding systems and linkages render a strategy that benefits both the U.S. and its allies? Common interests and risks to stakeholders highlight the benefit of a focused Army security cooperation enterprise policy of organizing to increase sales. A supporting strategy employing the tactics of seizing the initiative through business intelligence, targeting sales opportunities, and making sales that support the common needs of both allied requirements and U.S. modernization would support that policy.
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To mitigate funding impacts to modernization, foreign military sales need to be effective. In this context, sales effectiveness is achieved by way of better aligning existing or emerging allied requirements with U.S. modernization plans and production capacity. Given that not all sales are for equipment or for systems that the U.S. intends Utilizing existing resources, a cross enterprise team can implement this strategy.
Essential to this cross enterprise team is to know your customer, know your needs, know your capability to support, and aggressively go after the sale. The end result should contribute to the shaping of the international environment for the GCC. Additionally it mitigated a potential production line gap while securing Saudi Arabia early access to this needed capability. This sale was gained through aggressive action resulting in benefit to an ongoing modernization program, while contributing to the shaping of the GCC region by providing for equipment that complements U.S. forces.
To accomplish similar sales feats on a regular basis, the enterprise must perceive and pursue sales in a different manner. The enterprise can implement this change by taking a pushed requirement based system and altering it to a dynamic push and pull based system. This system would still receive customer requirements and support them as necessary, but would also seek to pull information by design from the environment putting the information (business intelligence) into an operational picture.
At the DoD level of security cooperation community, this could be accomplished through a policy of aggressively seeking mutually beneficial sales. The policies defined end is to How will leadership measure the effectiveness of this recommendation? The current metric of total FMS by commodity is only minimally adequate to measure the effectiveness of a strategy that emphasizes the cultural shift from taking orders to making sales. In addition to this metric, establish a metric of sales to need to measure the effectiveness of the targeted sales efforts. One aspect of effective sales is meeting a common need by selling available production capacity. As a notional example to illustrate this metric in use, consider the Apache helicopter program. Cold restart costs for aircraft production are high so as part of an enterprise targeted marketing plan the Army actively seeks a foreign military sale to include in its production plan. The Apache production program is going cold between two large U.S. production contracts. The OEM has capacity to produce seven aircraft per month, but has a threshold production requirement of two aircraft per month to keep the production line warm. A gap of six months needs to be filled; a sale of 12 aircraft (2 aircraft per month x 6 months) would successfully bridge the contracts. The Army wants to protect this capacity. The sale of that production capacity to meet the threshold would represent a means of measuring success. By determining, the sales required to meet the threshold capacity identified above and by then measuring against actual sales made that meet that requirement a useful metric is established. It provides the enterprise with the awareness it needs to decide and take action by measuring sales success in support of this modernization program. The sale to need metric focuses the enterprise on supporting modernization.
This metric can measure sales of unused production capacity, achieving economic order quantities by selling remaining capacity, creating linkage between U.S. contracts when funding is sporadic, and where production is cold -keeping it warm. Additionally, it is versatile enough to measure sales of depot level maintenance capacity sold supporting a common need in sustainment. The timing and use of this metric is critical.
Pre-contract planning and milestone based execution is preferred, but situations will occur requiring the leadership to triage a program mid-stream (i.e. post U.S. contract).
This metric is still useful in those cases when supported by an acceptable contract modification plan. To make this approach effective, early engagement is crucial.
Additionally, these sales will help maintain a healthy strategic industrial base by keeping production lines running that support modernization of our systems.
How do you test this recommendation? A low risk approach is to identify a program in a multi-year production contract with production line capacity remaining. Put in place the recommendations from above then build a sales package based upon the residual production capacity. Measure results using the sales to need metric. This approach will help understand the effectiveness of bringing this informed, matrixed 27 team, to bear on the problem. The bottom line is to confirm through testing that by providing the information across the enterprise and coordinating the stakeholders to secure sales where and when you need them is an effective strategy.
The effective employment of this recommendation will leverage an allied customer's resources to our mutual benefit thereby introducing a mitigation strategy that is intended to complement the Army's overarching strategic plan designed to reduce the negative effects of decreased RD&A budgets. Based upon the evidence of the beneficial impacts to existing Army modernization programs such as the Apache helicopter program, this paper establishes a policy concept and a feasible strategy. This strategy seeks to maintain or increase sales, while improving the effectiveness of those sales. Effective sales are gained by introducing foreign customers to programs where we have common needs and available capacity. The investment gained in these areas will reduce the risk to modernization and the industrial base. This mitigation is the second order effect of supporting our primary motive of improving our ability to operate with coalition partners thereby shaping the international environment to prevent or win our nation's wars.
Conclusion
Army strategic leaders must address the problem of decreasing budgets.
Budgets through this decade may be insufficient to achieve both force readiness and the stated Army 2020 modernization plan. With that in mind our leaders will have to make risk based resource decisions today to ready and outfit the Army of 2020. These decisions will be tempered with a desire to balance the equation between readiness and modernization. A single solution does not exist to solve this modernization funding 28 problem, but as highlighted in this paper the foreign military sales revenue stream does represent a mitigating opportunity.
A significant amount of foreign investment is infused into our Army programs every year through FMS. This opportunity can be exploited by pursuing three strategic objectives. First, focus on maintaining or increasing sales to reduce the impact caused by decreasing budgets on Army modernization and the industrial base. Second, make sales more effective. To be effective, a sale just for the sake of a sale is not enough.
The sale must effectively draw from available production capacity or meet a common modernization need. Therefore, the sale must seek to align existing or emerging foreign customer requirements with U.S. modernization and production needs. By aggressively hunting down common needs and effectively placing the sale where the Army needs it, risk is reduced for modernization programs. Last, by pursuing increased and effective sales, this provides an opportunity to strategically shape the international environment.
This occurs by way of increased security cooperation engagement, partner capacity, and the integration of militaries through common systems and training. This is FMS' fundamental purpose and the natural outcome from security cooperation, but further leveraging and maximizing this outcome will be critical to the Army as our forward presence recedes and our force structure gets smaller. It is in our interest to have allies or coalition members trained and equipped in a manner that helps ensure their success in war, and when necessary, complements our forces during combined operations.
Endnotes
